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Reed v. Salazar, ___F. Supp. 2d___, 2010 WL 3853218, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 129845 
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2010). 
 
 
Matt Newman 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Two environmental advocacy groups challenged the decision of the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) to grant operational management of the National Bison Range in 
western Montana to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation.  
The District Court for the District of Columbia held the Service‘s decision to classify the 
management agreement as a categorical exclusion to environmental review violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act.  The Court held the management agreement be set aside, effectively 
returning control of the National Bison Range to FWS. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Reed v. Salazar was decided on September 28, 2010 by the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia.
333
  The decision is the culmination of two separate but related suits 
challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service‘s (FWS) decision to grant administrative control 
of the National Bison Range (the Range) in western Montana to the Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation (CSKT).  In a consolidated opinion, the court held 
that the FWS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by re-granting control of 
the National Basin Range to the CSKT without first performing an environmental assessment.
334
  
                                                          
333
 Reed v. Salazar, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 129845 (D.D.C.  Sept. 28, 2010). 
334
 Id. at *55 (The dispute in this case is over the second grant of control given to the CSKT over the Range.  For a 
history of CSKT management of the Range: see below). 
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As a result of this violation, the court returned the responsibility to manage the Bison Range to 
FWS.
335
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 The National Bison Range Complex is a large preserve in western Montana that includes 
the National Bison Range, Swan Lake, Pablo and Ninepipe National Wildlife Refuges, and the 
Northwest Montana Wetland District.
336
  The Range was created by President Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1908 to conserve populations of American bison that had been severely reduced 
over the past half century.
337
  The range lies entirely within the borders of the Flathead 
Reservation, home to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes.
338
 
 In early 2003 the CSKT contacted the Secretary of the Interior indicating an interest in 
establishing an Annual Funding Agreement (AFA) for the operation and day-to-day management 
of the Range.
339
  After a year of negotiations, the CSKT and the FWS reached an agreement, 
becoming effective on March 15, 2005.
340
  The 2005 AFA required the CSKT to perform duties 
in five areas:  general Range management, biological and habitat management, fire management, 
Range fence maintenance, and visitor services.
341
  Although day-to-day operations were given to 
the CSKT and its employees, overall responsibility for the Range remained in the hands of a 
FWS Manager.
342
 
                                                          
335
 Id. at *59. 
336
 Id. at *14. 
337
 Id. 
338
 Id. 
339
 Id. at*15 (Annual Funding Agreements are made between federal agencies and Indian tribes pursuant to the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 and its amendments.  The Act seeks to further the 
policy of Tribes administering the programs, services, and administrative duties that would normally be performed 
by the federal government.  Id. at *5). 
340
 Id. at *16. 
341
 Id. 
342
 Id. 
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 One year after the 2005 AFA went into effect, the FWS Manager for the Range submitted 
a report on CSKT‘s implementation of the management plan.343  The report indicated that only 
forty-one percent of the duties performed by the CSKT were rated as successful.
344
  One month 
after the FWS Manger‘s report was submitted a FWS employee issued a memorandum listing 
several major deficiencies in the CSKT‘s management and operation of the Range.345 
 Despite the negative performance evaluations, the FWS decided to extend the 2005 AFA 
into the 2007 fiscal year.
346
  In September 2006, seven FWS employees filed an informal 
grievance, alleging the CSKT had created a hostile work environment at the Range.
347
  In 
December, the FWS Project Leader formally recommended the FWS reassume day-to-day 
control over food distribution to the animals.
348
  The next day the FWS regional director 
requested the Secretary of the Interior to terminate the 2005 AFA and end all negotiations of 
extending management by the CSKT in the future.
349
 
 On December 11, 2006, the FWS formally notified the CSKT that the 2005 AFA would 
be terminated, and all negotiations for future management plans would stop immediately.
350
  The 
termination notice listed several instances of major mismanagement by the CSKT as justification 
for the decision.
351
  The CSKT appealed the FWS‘s decision to the Board of Indian Appeals, 
                                                          
343
 Id. 
344
 Id. 
345
 Id. at *17 
346
 Id. 
347
 Id. at *18. 
348
 Id. 
349
 Id. 
350
 Id. at *19. 
351
 Id. (The notice cited specifically as grounds for termination:  under-feeding of animals by CSKT employees; 
deficient fence maintenance that led to several escapes; and the death of a cow bison that became trapped in 
loose barbed wire and was stomped to death by another bison.  Id. at *20).  
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claiming the FWS was required to give notice before terminating the agreement, and that reports 
by FWS employees alleging mismanagement by the CSKT were not accurate.
352
 
 While the appeal was pending, Deputy Secretary of the Interior Lynn Scarlett wrote a 
letter to FWS and Bureau of Indian Affairs officials expressing disappointment in how officials 
handled the termination of the 2005 AFA.
353
  Deputy Secretary Scarlett directed the officials to 
immediately begin the process of renegotiating a new AFA for fiscal year 2007.
354
  After a 
troubled start, negotiations were finally successful and, in June of 2008, CSKT was granted a 
new AFA for fiscal years 2009-2011.
355
  The 2008 AFA gave the CSKT more control over 
management decisions and created a new ―Refuge Leadership Team‖ consisting of officials from 
the CSKT and the FWS that would collaborate on management policy.
356
 
III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Soon after the 2008 AFA became effective, two separate suits were filed challenging the 
act.
357
  The first suit was filed by Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER), a 
group of public employees which counted as it members former FWS employees who had 
worked at the Range and local area ranchers whose land is adjacent to the Range.
358
  This group 
of plaintiffs became known as the Reed plaintiffs.
359
  The second suit was filed by The Blue 
Goose Alliance, a separate group of former and current FWS employees.
360
  Both suits allege 
that the 2008 AFA and the process by which it was created violated several federal laws 
including the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, the Indian Self-
                                                          
352
 Id. at *21. 
353
 Id. 
354
 Id. 
355
 Id. at *22. 
356
 Id. (quotations omitted). 
357
 Id. at *2. 
358
 Id. at *36. 
359
 Id. at *2 
360
 Id. at *40. 
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Determination and Education Assistance Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).
361
 
 Both suits were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia.  All parties to the 
suit filed motions for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.
362
 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S DECISION 
A.  Both the Reed plaintiffs and the Blue Goose Alliance plaintiffs had standing to 
challenge 2008 AFA. 
 
 The FWS and the CSKT challenged the standing for both plaintiff groups to sue in 
federal court.  For the Reed and Blue Goose plaintiffs, the FWS claimed the parties did not have 
standing to challenge the 2008 AFA because they did not suffer any ―concrete‖ and 
―particularized‖ injuries from the CSKT‘s management of the Range.363  To assert standing, a 
plaintiff must show: 
 1.  That they suffered injury in fact, which is the invasion of a legally protected 
 interest that is: 
  (a) Concrete and particularized  
  (b) Actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; 
 2.  That there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct at issue, 
 such that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged act; and 
 3.  That it is likely, as opposed to speculative, that the injury will be redressed by 
 a favorable decision.
364
 
 
 The court noted that in environmental cases, such as this one, the injury in fact is usually 
established by showing that the plaintiffs had a ―recreational or aesthetic interest in [the] 
                                                          
361
 Id. at *2-3. 
362
 Id. at *3 (“The judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on 
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). 
363
 Id. at *34-40. 
364
 Id. at *32-33. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61) (emphasis added). 
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particular land that [would] be adversely affected by the challenged action.‖365  Such a showing 
would indicate that the injury in fact is sufficiently concrete and particularized.  The court, citing 
the troubled history of the CSKT‘s management of the Range, found that plaintiffs‘ aesthetic 
enjoyment of the Range would be harmed by future CSKT management.
366
 
 To establish that injury is imminent, the plaintiffs only needed to show a desire to visit 
the location in question.
367
  However, ―someday‖ intentions that lack any specification of when 
the day to visit will come would not support a finding of actual or imminent injury.
368
 
 Both the Reed plaintiffs and the Blue Goose plaintiffs provided depositions and affidavits 
from former FWS employees who had visited and worked in the Range and its adjoining 
preserves.
369
  These testimonials indicated that the plaintiffs had regularly been to the Range in 
the past and intended to return to the range in the near future.
370
  Both the FWS and the CSKT 
argued that these intentions to return were too speculative in nature to establish injury in fact.
371
  
The court soundly rejected this argument.
372
 
 Based on the history of management problems related to the CSKT and the substantial 
indications that several individual plaintiffs planned to return to the Range, the court held that the 
plaintiffs had met their standing requirements to challenge the 2008 AFA in federal court.
373
 
B.  The decision by the FWS to classify the 2008 AFA as a Categorical Exclusion to 
environmental review was arbitrary and capricious, and thus in violation of NEPA. 
 
 The plaintiffs argued that the FWS violated NEPA when they did not conduct an 
environmental analysis of the 2008 AFA before it became effective.
374
  The FWS claimed that 
                                                          
365
 Id. at *35 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000)). 
366
 Id. at *39. 
367
 Id. 
368
 Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564). 
369
 Id. at *36-41. 
370
 Id. at *36-41. 
371
 Id. at *38. 
372
 Id. at *39. 
373
 Id. at *43. 
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the 2008 AFA could be classified as a categorical exclusion under NEPA, and thus did not 
require an environmental review.
375
 
 The major working provision of NEPA is the requirement that ―all agencies of the federal 
government‖ prepare and publish a detailed environmental analysis for ―major federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.‖376  This analytic document is 
called an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
377
  A full EIS is not required if a federal 
agency makes a determination through a lesser report, an Environmental Assessment (EA), that 
the proposed action would not significantly affect the environment.
378
  The EA is ―a concise 
public document‖ that makes the early indication of whether there is sufficient evidence to 
justify a full EIS on the action.
379
 
 An agency does not need to prepare an EIS or an EA if it determines the action is subject 
to a Categorical Exclusion (CE).
380
  A CE is defined as a ―category of actions which do not have 
a significant impact on the human environment and which have been found to have no such 
effect in procedures adopted by a federal agency in implementation of these regulations.‖381  If 
an agency finds that a particular action falls within a CE the agency is still obligated to determine 
if any ―extraordinary circumstances‖ would nonetheless justify an environmental analysis.382  
Once a CE has been established and the agency has properly determined that no extraordinary 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
374
 Id. 
375
 Id. at *43-44. 
376
 Id. at *8 (citing Found. on Econ. Trends v. Hecker, 756 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
377
 Id. 
378
 Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C. 2006)). 
379
 Id. at *9 (citing Dept. of Trans. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004)). 
380
 Id. 
381
 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §1507.3 9 (2010)). 
382
 Id. at *11 (citing 40 C.F.R. §1508.49, 43 C.F.R. § 46.215 (2010)). 
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circumstances are applicable the decision will only be set aside by a court if the decision was 
arbitrary and capricious.
383
 
 The plaintiffs argued that the decision of the FWS to classify the 2008 AFA as a CE was 
arbitrary and capricious because the FWS failed to do any analysis prior to the classification.
384
  
The FWS argued that it was not required to conduct a new analysis because the prior analysis 
which led to CE status for the previous 2005 AFA was sufficient to grant a CE for the 2008 
AFA.
385
  The court, however, rejected this argument and determined that, the FWS had acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in light of ―substantial evidence in the record that an extraordinary 
circumstance may apply‖386  In support of its rejection of the FWS argument, the court cited 
substantial evidence of environmental harm during the CSKT‘s previous management of the 
Range.  Such examples included the finding that only forty-one percent of duties performed by 
the CSKT were deemed successful; lack of electric fence maintenance by the CSKT that led to 
escapes and later the trampling of a cow bison; and, evidence that the CSKT had significantly 
underfed 64 bison that were awaiting transfer to another preserve.
387
  The court held that the 
FWS decision was arbitrary and capricious because the FWS relied on its previous 2005 CE 
classification for the new 2008 AFA, and this 2005 CE did not include an evaluation of the 
mismanagement of the Range by the CSKT subsequent to the 2005 AFA.
388
 
C.  The proper remedy for the NEPA violation was rescission of the 2009 AFA and 
reestablishment of FWS control over the Range. 
 
                                                          
383
 Id. at *44 (citing Back Co. Horsemen v. Johanns, 424 F. Supp. 2d 89, 99 (D.D.C. 2006)). 
384
 Id. 
385
 Id. at *45. 
386
 Id. at *55. 
387
 Id. at *50. 
388
 Id. at *55. 
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 After finding that the 2008 AFA was in violation of NEPA, the court next determined the 
proper remedy.
389
  The court held that the NEPA violation in this case was governed by the 
default remedy in the Administrative Procedure Act which states that a court will ―hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.‖390  The CSKT, however, argued 
that rescission of the 2008 AFA was not an appropriate remedy because:  (1) such a ruling would 
threaten the ―long-term contractual relationship‖ the CSKT had formed with the FWS; and (2) 
rescission would be major disruption to the operations and management of the Range.
391
  The 
court however, held that it was not without discretion in issuing the proper remedy.
392
  The court 
rejected the CSKT‘s remedy argument, stating that ―this is not a case where ‗the egg has been 
scrambled and there is no apparent way to restore the status quo ante.‘‖393  The court held that 
the CSKT had not shown any compelling evidence that rescission of the 2008 AFA would be 
unduly disruptive to the day-to-day operation of the Range.
394
  In fact, the court asserted that 
rescission will likely have little impact on the operations of the Range because the FWS staff 
already working on the Range could easily assume the duties performed by the CSKT.
395
  The 
court therefore held, pursuant to the APA, that the 2008 AFA should be voided, and operational 
control of the Range should be given back to the FWS.
396
  Because the court found the Secretary 
of the Interior, in approving the CE for the 2008 AFA, violated NEPA,the court determined that 
setting aside the CE approval was an adequate remedy to redress the plaintiffs‘ injuries.  The 
                                                          
389
 Id. 
390
 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.A §706(2) (West 2007)). 
391
 Id. at *57. 
392
 Id. at *56. 
393
 Id. at *58 (citing Sugar Cane Growers Coop. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
394
 Id. 
395
 Id. 
396
 Id. at *59. 
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court thus dismissed the plaintiffs‘ other claims for violations of the National Wildlife Refuge 
System Administration Act and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.
397
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Depending on one‘s perspective Reed v. Salazar is either a solid victory or a striking 
defeat.  From the environmental law perspective the case is another example of an advocacy 
group holding a federal agency accountable to NEPA and other federal rules.  From an Indian 
law perspective the case is yet another example of Tribes attempting to manage their own affairs 
under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act only to be stopped by outside 
interests.  For the time being the Range is back under federal control.  However, given the 
importance of the Range to both sides it is doubtful that Reed v. Salazar will be the final word on 
the management of the National Bison Range. 
 
  
                                                          
397
 Id. at *60. 
